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Abstract
The multiparty key exchange introduced in Steiner et al. and presented
in more general form by the authors is known to be secure against passive
attacks. In this paper, an active attack is presented assuming malicious
control of the communications of the last two users for the duration of
only the key exchange.
1 Introduction
The increased use of light and mobile devices has led to the study of the so called
mobile ad hoc networks. These are created, operated and managed by the nodes
themselves and therefore are solely dependent upon the cooperative and trusting
nature of the nodes. The ad hoc property of these mobile networks implies that
the network is formed in an unplanned manner to meet an immediate demand
and specific goal, and that the nodes are continuously joining or leaving the
network. Thus, key management in this type of networks is a very important
issue and has been the aim of numerous works since then (see [1] or [5] and their
references).
One of the most widely known such schemes is due to Steiner et al. and
is known as Cliques (cf. [4]). Cliques is a multiparty key exchange protocol
generalizing the Diffie-Hellman key exchange based on the discrete logarithm
problem. It is composed of an initial key agreement (IKA) to set up a first
common key and an auxiliary key agreement (AKA) in order to refresh the key
at any later stage.
In [3], the authors propose a systematic way for analyzing protocol suites
which extend the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange scheme to a group setting. They
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find interesting attacks which exploit algebraic properties of Diffie-Hellman ex-
ponentiation. However, our attack uses a different approach that exploits a
weakness of a specific protocol and allows for prolonged eavesdropping.
We will consider in particular one of the proposed initial key agreements
referred to (in [4]) as IKA.2. The authors generalize these schemes in [2], con-
sidering a general action on a semigroup, and this is how IKA.2 is presented
below.
We will then show an active attack on this protocol that requires control
of the communications of two particular parties for only the duration of the
key exchange. That is, unlike in a regular man-in-the-middle attack, it is not
necessary for the attacker to control the communications after the key exchange
in order to translate messages, since all users are made to agree on the same
key.
Although it is not possible for the attacker to keep a copy of the key after
the users initiate AKA operations, we will show how she can avoid being noticed
at that point.
2 An Initial Key Agreement protocol
The protocol below gives n users the possibility to share an initial common key
built using their private keys. A proof of its correctness and security against
passive attacks can be found in [2, 4], assuming the Diffie-Hellman problem is
hard for the given group action.
Suppose we have n users U1, . . . ,Un who wish to agree upon a common key.
Let G be an abelian group, written multiplicatively. Let S be a set, and
suppose we have a group action
G× S → S
(g, s) 7→ g · s.
The users publicly agree on a common element C0 = s ∈ S, and for each
i = 1, . . . , n, the user Ui selects a secret group element gi ∈ G.
The protocol proceeds as follows:
(1) For i = 1, . . . , n− 2, Ui sends to Ui+1 the message Ci = gi · Ci−1.
(2) Un−1 broadcasts Cn−1 = gn−1 · Cn−2 to the other users U1, . . . ,Un−2,Un.
(3) Un computes the shared key K = gn · Cn−1.
(4) For i = 1, . . . , n− 1, Ui sends Di = g
−1
i · Cn−1 to Un.
(5) Un broadcasts {gn ·D1, gn ·D2, . . . , gn ·Dn−1, Cn−1} to Ui, i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
(6) For i = 1, . . . , n− 1, Ui computes the shared key K = gi · (gn ·Di).
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It is easy to see that for i = 1, . . . , n− 1, we have that
Ci =
( i∏
j=1
gj
)
· s,
Di =
( n−1∏
j=1
j 6=i
gj
)
· s,
and finally
K = Cn =
( n∏
j=1
gj
)
· s.
From the above, we can also observe that Cn−1 is not needed by any user
to recover the session key K. However, this information is disclosed for future
rekeying purposes, as we will see later.
Example 1. Let Fq be a finite field. Let us consider an element g of prime order
p, generating the subgroup S ⊂ F∗q. Then the action Φ: Z
∗
p × S → S defined
by Φ(x, h) = hx provides the Initial Key Agreement protocol introduced in [4,
Section 4.2] as IKA.2.
Example 2. Let us denote by ε the group of points of an elliptic curve of
prime order p. Then the action Φ: Z∗p × ε → ε defined by Φ(x, P ) = xP gives
an elliptic curve version of IKA.2 cited above.
3 An active attack on the Initial Key Agreement
We describe an active attack on the protocol of the preceding section. Suppose
that the attacker M wants the users U1, . . . ,Un to agree on a shared key as
usual, except that she is in possession of the key as well.
In order to carry out our attack, M needs to have full control over the
communication of the users Un−1 and Un for the duration of the key exchange.
However, unlike in a regular man-in-the-middle attack, she does not need to
maintain this control after the key exchange is completed.
In the beginning, M chooses her own secret group element gˆ ∈ G. She then
proceeds as follows:
(a) Step (1) is carried out as usual.
(b) M intercepts the broadcast of Un−1 during step (2) and remembers the
value Cn−1. At this point, all users except for Un−1 are sitting in step (2),
waiting for the broadcast that was halted.
(c) Un−1 proceeds to step (4), where he sends g
−1
n−1 ·Cn−1 = Cn−2 to Un. This
is also intercepted by M. Un−1 is now waiting in step (5).
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(d) M now makes Un believe that he received the broadcast of step (2), but
actually sends him gˆ · Cn−1. At this point, Un computes the shared key
K = gngˆ · Cn−1 and waits in step (4).
(e) M now sends to Un the values {m1, . . . ,mn−3, Cn−2, Cn−1}, pretending that
they were sent by the other users in step (4). The mi are random elements
of the orbit G · s.
(f) In step (5), Un sends back, among others, the values gn ·Cn−2 and gn ·Cn−1,
which M intercepts. The user Un is now finished, and M can compute the
shared key K = gˆgn · Cn−1.
(g) Until now, U1, . . . ,Un−2 have been waiting for the broadcast in step (2),
which M now provides in the form of gn · Cn−1.
(h) Ui, i = 1 . . . , n − 2, go to step (4) and send back g
−1
i gn · Cn−1, which M
intercepts.
(i) In step (5), M broadcasts to Ui, i = 1 . . . , n− 2, the message
{gˆg−11 gn · Cn−1, gˆg
−1
2 gn · Cn−1, . . . , gˆg
−1
n−1gn · Cn−1, gn · Cn−1}
User Un−1 is sent the same message, but the last element, gn · Cn−1 is
substituted by Cn−1.
(j) The users U1, . . . ,Un−2 now all compute the shared secret K = gigˆg
−1
i gn ·
Cn−1.
Let us make some comments on the attack introduced above. First, we can
observe that at the end of this procedure, all users as well as the attacker share
the same key
K =
( n∏
j=1
gj
)
· (gˆ · s).
Any passive observer will still be unable to determine the key, for the same
reason that the original protocol is secure against passive attacks, cf. [4, The-
orem 2.1], whose proof also applies to the general setting given in Section 2
whenever the action is transitive and the Diffie-Hellman problem is hard.
The attacker’s secret gˆ is not strictly required for the attack to work, but
without it, the users may notice that something is amiss. Namely, in step (e),
if we leave out gˆ, the user Un may notice that M sent the same value Cn−1 as
in step (d). Similarly, in step (i), the other users could notice that the attacker
just returned their transmission from (h). Using gˆ, however, the users should
be unable to tell the difference between a regular execution of the protocol and
the attack, again as a consequence of [4, Theorem 2.1].
As in the Initial Key Agreement (IKA) protocol introduced in Section 2, the
broadcast element gn ·Cn−1 is added at the end of the message in (i) in view of
future rekeying operations and is not needed by any of the users U1, . . . ,Un−2
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to recover the shared key. Note that users Ui, i = 1, . . . , n− 2, expect that the
last element of the message sent in step (i) is the one broadcast in step (2) of
the protocol, which the attacker substitutes precisely by gn · Cn−1. In the case
of user Un−1, who is also expecting the element sent in step (2) of the protocol,
the element that M sends in step (b) is Cn−1. If this is not satisfied, the users
might notice that something is wrong.
4 An exit strategy
After the attack of Section 3, the attacker M shares the key with the users
U1, . . . ,Un and can listen in on their conversation without any further active
measures. However, at some point after that, the users may wish to execute an
AKA operation, which is to say a key refreshment, the addition of a new member
to the group, etc. as described in [4, Section 5]. After this point, the attacker
can certainly no longer listen to the conversation. Even worse, the values the
users remember from step (5) of the protocol are substantially different from
normal, and any key refresh operation will thus fail completely, alerting the
users about the attack.
In what follows, we will describe how the attacker can avoid being noticed
by forging key refresh operations herself, assuming that any user may initiate a
key refreshment at any time.
First, we recall the key refresh operation after a regular execution of IKA.2,
adapted from [4, Section 5.6]. Suppose user Uc wishes to initiate a key refresh-
ment. He remembers from step (5) of the key agreement protocol the values
{E1, . . . , En}, where Ek =
(∏n
j=1,j 6=k gj
)
·s, k = 1, . . . , n. He picks a new secret
g′c ∈ G and broadcasts
{g′c · E1, . . . , g
′
c ·Ec−1, Ec, g
′
c · Ec+1, . . . , g
′
c · En}.
Now, all users can compute the new key g′c · Cn = g
′
c ·
(∏n
j=1 gj
)
· s. User Uc
also replaces his own secret with g′cgc, and everyone replaces the information
remembered from step (5) with this new broadcast.
Remark 4.1. One important detail to note is that when Uc initiates the key
refreshment, the value Ec he sends in position c is unchanged and already known
to the other users. Hence, if M wishes to forge a key refreshment coming from
Uc, she has to make sure that each user receives in position c the value he
previously held there. Otherwise, the attack could be discovered.
Suppose now that the attacker M has just executed the attack from Sec-
tion 3. Instead of {E1, . . . , En}, the users now remember the following values:
• For i = 1, . . . , n− 2, Ui remembers {gˆ ·E1, . . . , gˆ · En−1, Cn}.
• Un−1 remembers {gˆ · E1, . . . , gˆ ·En−1, En}.
• Un remembers {gn ·m1, . . . , gn ·mn−3, En−1, Cn, gˆ · En}.
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Evidently, if some user tries to initiate a key refreshment with these values,
the operation will fail. However, M can bring the users into a consistent state
by forging two key refresh operations herself. For this, she needs to still have
control over the communications of Un−1 and Un, as in the original attack.
First, M picks two new random values fˆ and hˆ ∈ G. Then, she forges a key
refresh operation by sending the following values to the different users:
• To Ui, i = 1, . . . , n− 2, she sends
{hˆgˆ · E1, hˆgˆ · E2, . . . , hˆgˆ ·En−2, gˆ · En−1, fˆ hˆgˆ ·En},
pretending it came from Un−1.
• To Un−1, she sends
{fˆ hˆgˆ · E1, hˆgˆ · E2, . . . , hˆgˆ · En−2, hˆgˆ · En−1, En},
pretending it came from Un.
• To Un, she sends
{fˆ hˆgˆ ·E1, hˆgˆ · E2, . . . , hˆgˆ ·En−2, Cn, hˆgˆEn},
pretending it came from Un−1.
After this, the users will agree on the shared key hˆgˆ · Cn, which is also known
to M. As remarked above, if a user is made to believe that he received a key
refreshment from Uc, he must receive in position c the value he already held
there.
Now, the values held by the users are still inconsistent, so M has to forge a
second key refreshment:
• To Ui, i = 1, . . . , n− 2, she sends
{fˆ hˆgˆ ·E1, . . . , fˆ hˆgˆ ·En},
pretending it came from Un.
• To Un−1 and Un, she sends
{fˆ hˆgˆ ·E1, . . . , fˆ hˆgˆ ·En},
pretending it came from U1.
Now, all users and the attacker agree on the shared key fˆ hˆgˆ·Cn. Furthermore, all
users remember the same consistent values for key refreshment. If in the future
any user initiates a key refreshment or other AKA operation, the attacker will
lose access to the key, but the operation itself will work out without problem
and without the users noticing anything wrong.
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Remark 4.2. An alternative course of action forM is to convert the attack into
a regular man-in-the-middle attack on Un at the time of the first key refreshment.
For this, note that given the values each user remembers, a key refreshment
initiated by Uc, c ≤ n − 2, works well for all users but Un. The attacker can
then intercept the broadcast arriving at Un and replace it with random values,
except that at position n she sends hˆ · En for some random hˆ ∈ G, and at
position c she sends gn ·mc, which she knows from step (f) of the attack. Then,
M will have the key gˆg′c ·Cn in common with Ui, i ≤ n−1, as well as hˆ ·Cn with
Un. From then on, she can run a regular man-in-the-middle attack. A similar
attack can be carried out if Un initiates a key refreshment, but not if Un−1 does
so. In this case, the attacker can intercept and apply gˆ to the message for Un
so that all users agree on a common key without noticing the previous attack.
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